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In this new millennium, the United States stands at a crossroads regarding its nuclear deterrence posture -how best to adjust the composition of its strategic nuclear forces and the structure of its nuclear deterrence policy. After nearly half a century of nuclear standoff, the U.S emerged from the Cold War as the sole superpower. As the world's "benevolent hegemon," the U.S. continues to adapt to a changed multi-polar world and to transform itself to an uncertain future. The Bush Administration has charted a course forward -a plan that leaves the Cold War and post-Cold War periods behind and that postures the U.S. for the uncertainties of "The Third
Millennium."
The tragic events of the 11 September ushered in profound geopolitical change and helped galvanize U.S. resolve to root out the scourges of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In this unprecedented time, President Bush aggressively moved forward to redefine the nature of nuclear deterrence. He forged remarkable alliances and engaged his sole nuclear peer, Russia. He initiated a plan to fundamentally change the calculus of nuclear stockpiles, strategic alliances, arms control, and ballistic missile defense (BMD). His rhetoric announced fundamental change in U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy --drastic cuts to nuclear force structure, abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and a commitment to deploy a BMD System. The year 2002 appears to be the beginning of a new era; one marked by a unique set of conditions and a cast of characters on a mission of fundamental change to nuclear deterrent strategy. This paper will assess the Bush Administration's plan for strategic deterrence in the third millennium. It will examine the concept of deterrence and review the strategies used in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. It will assess the current and emerging strategic threats posed by rogue state and non-state actors. It will examine the emerging nuclear deterrent strategy espoused by the Bush Administration in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). It will discuss recent changes to the ABM Treaty and the development of BMD. And finally, this paper will assess the Bush plan using a framework for strategic objectives -Deterrence, Dissuasion, Defense and Denial -and then provide alternative strategies in comparison to the Bush Plan.
DETERRENCE THEORY
The fundamentals of nuclear deterrence theory have changed little since the creation of nuclear weapons during the Second World War. The most important aspect of deterrence remains its purpose -how to influence what an enemy thinks and does. Deterrence is a state of mind that prevents a deterree from acting in a way the deterrer considers harmful. Deterrence works only if the intended deterree chooses to be deterred. Its components are both physical and psychological. First, a series of military instruments are required that are sufficient to threaten an opponent in certain ways. Second, he must be convinced to not even think of attacking. Deterrence is successful only if the deterring nation has the political will to use its weapons and deterrence is credible only if the deterring nation is able to convey to the deterree that it is both capable and willing. 2 Many historians argue that the absence of a large-scale war in Europe after the Second World War proved that nuclear deterrence worked. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argued this point in remarks she made to the Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, "Both our countries know from bitter experience that conventional weapons do not deter war in Europe whereas nuclear weapons have done so over 40 years.
3 Though her statement is most likely true, the effectiveness of deterrence is hard to measure. When it works, the effects of deterrence are almost invisible. It is assumed to be successful when deterrence prevents actions by adversaries. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons and their potentially catastrophic destructive capabilities created a unique security environment whereby rational statesmen never went to the brink due to the unimaginable consequences. Creating a secure environment with the right mix of nuclear weapons remains the challenge for today.
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James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense for President Ford, explained the critical elements of deterrence. He maintained that the goal of the military might of the U.S. and its allies during the late forties was to create an effective structure of deterrence that precluded outright military assault by the Soviet Union. He remarked that the heart of deterrence laid in the credibility of strategies and forces to response in the event of a direct military assault. He contended that in the absence of a credible response, deterrence is nothing but a façade. The capacity to threaten with a credible response made deterrence effective and thereby making credibility a key component of deterrence.
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Nuclear weapons provide the credible response capability of the U.S. military. The purpose of these weapons is to deter the use of WMD -nuclear, chemical, and biological -in crisis or conflict. Nuclear deterrence prevents other possessors of nuclear weapons from using them by the threat of nuclear retaliation. The nuclear force may also be used to threaten and to discourage biological, chemical or large-scale conventional aggression. During the Cold war, the U.S. threatened the use of nuclear weapons to deter a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Union against NATO. Additionally, the U.S. did not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons in such an event.
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COLD WAR NUCLEAR STRATEGY
Since the advent of nuclear weapons, strategic deterrence has been the central military theme that framed the U.S. military strategy of the post Second World War era. It was formulated and implemented in a bipolar environment dominated by the hostility between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. The communist aggression of the 1950s in Czechoslovakia, Berlin and Korea created immense tension that caused many Western leaders to think that unless the Soviet Union could be deterred, the Soviets would likely attack and seize Western Europe. U.S. nuclear weapons became the main instrument of the deterring strategy.
They alone offered the threat of catastrophic punishment.
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Nuclear deterrence strategy evolved throughout the Cold War and changes in the composition of nuclear arsenal helped drive this evolution -increased number, type, and yield and the improved methods of delivery. This paper will assess the Cold War deterrent strategy using the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) common framework for developing strategy -the relationship of ends, ways, and means. Robert Dorff and Joseph Cerami, both USAWC instructors, gave the following interpretation:
…Strategy is the relationship of ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources). How do we best use the available means to pursue our objectives? [Of late, we are]… confusing a strategic concept (deterrence) with the means (nuclear weapons). We deter an actor from undertaking a specific action in order to achieve a specific objective (non-use of nuclear weapons, preservation of peace, avoidance of war, etc.). Deterrence is not an objective …, although it was spoken as such during the Cold War… Rather, deterrence is one way of achieving the objective. Strategic nuclear deterrence, especially MAD [mutually assured destruction], was a specific way of using a specific means (nuclear weapons) to achieve a larger strategic objective. Viewed in this way, it then even more apparent that there must be different means we can use in different ways (including in combination) against different actors to deter different actions. 
POST-COLD WAR -THE CLINTON-ERA
In the decade after the Cold War, the nuclear deterrent posture of the U.S. changed little under the Clinton Administration. The Administration came into office at a time of great strategic uncertainty regarding the status of nuclear forces of Russia and the former Soviet states. The Clinton-era was marked by the first post-Cold War nuclear weapons review and the continued reliance on strategic arms control treaties. In November 1997, President Clinton issued a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) that explained the purposes of U.S. nuclear weapons and provided broad guidance for developing operational plans for their use. The 1997 PDD, the first since the Carter Administration, outlined U.S. policy for the use of nuclear weapons. The PDD was notable for two way, though it continued to define deterrence in Cold War terms. First, it abandoned a previous tenet that the U.S. must remain prepared to fight a protracted nuclear war. And second, it stated that nuclear weapons would play a smaller but vital role in the future and hedge against an uncertain future.
The PDD continued to link U.S. deterrence to "a wide-range of nuclear retaliatory options," an "all-or-nothing response" and "sufficient ambiguity" regarding counter-attack. President
Clinton's PDD was a sharp reminder that the purposes of nuclear weapons had changed little since the end of the Cold War. Russian nuclear threat and it linked nuclear retaliation to the use of WMD.
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The NSS and Administration efforts showed tepid support for BMD. The NSS touted the development of a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system designed to counter emerging ballistic missile threats from rogue states that might threaten the continental U.S. The NMD architecture included: 100 ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska, one ABM radar in Alaska, and five upgraded early warning radars. The NSS alleged this approach would provide a limited protection to all fifty U.S. states that was the fastest, most affordable, and most technically mature approach. On 1 September 2000, however, President Clinton announced he would not make a deployment decision and instead passed it to his successor. He deferred his decision to delay based on technical immaturity and unproven capability of NMD. President
Clinton continued to recognize a relationship among the ABM Treaty, strategic stability, and the START process. He was publicly committed to working with the Russians on any modifications to the ABM Treaty. He firmly subordinated NMD to the treaty and tied the deployment of any limited system to existing arms control and nuclear nonproliferation objectives.
14 The Clinton strategy relied on the fundamental precepts of the Cold War -mutual assured destruction, retaliation, and vulnerability. This era remained focused on a threat from Russia and the series of treaties that were designed to reduce nuclear stockpiles and limit U.S.
development of defenses. The weakness of this strategy was that it ceded the initiative to the Russians and left the U.S. in a position of reaction. The Cold War paradigm continued. 
GLOBAL THREATS AND ACTORS
In 1999, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) summarized the global threats for the Senate Armed Services Committee. The DIA assessed the current strategic nuclear environment as considerably more diverse and complex with significant implications for strategic force and deterrence planning. They assessed an enduring strategic nuclear threat from Russia, China and some rogue states. Russia continued to rely almost entirely on its strategic nuclear forces (SNF) to help offset the decline of its conventional forces. Russia had prioritized its strategic force and invested scarce resources to develop only one new missile and to improve command, control, and communications (C3) capabilities. China's SNF, though small and dated, received a top priority for strategic nuclear modernization. China invested in several new missile programs and upgraded its existing systems with associated C3 capabilities.
Though China's modernization did not give it a 'first strike' capability, China planned to field large numbers of ICBMs capable of reaching the U.S.
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The DIA assessment of rogue nations was telling. North Korea and Iran were expected to have a rudimentary ICBM capability in a few short years. The enablers for this included the proliferation of missile components, technology and expertise; the desire for long-range ballistic missiles; and a crash course missile development program. The DIA assumed all hostile missiles would be armed with WMD but admitted it had only a limited ability to track the progress of these hostile programs.
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In 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided an updated assessment before the Senate Intelligence Committee. The CIA's update expressed added concern with the growing number of state and non-state actors pursuing WMD and ballistic missiles. The threat from nuclear weapons had grown. Along with Russia and China, the CIA added North Korea, Iran, and Iraq to the list of potential nuclear states. The CIA believed these programs were indigenously developed with the help of some direct foreign assistance. The CIA further warned that while these programs produced far fewer missiles with less accuracy, yield, survivability, and reliability than those of Russia or China, they still posed a threat to U.S. interests.
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The CIA chronicled a list of rogue state motivations to develop WMD and ballistic missiles.
For some, they were warfighting tools to augment conventional forces and for others, they were 
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ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE -THE DOMESTIC "NO NUKES" VIEW
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, there have been persons who adamantly oppose anything "nuclear" and who base their arguments on weighty convictions. Their moral arguments are hard to dispute and as in things Utopian, most would agree with the theoretical argument against nuclear weapons. The reality differs from the theory. We cannot un-invent nuclear weapons and like it or not, they are necessary and relevant for the foreseeable future.
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Many nay-saying organizations continue to debunk U.S. nuclear deterrence and BMD policies. To many in those organizations, the end of the Cold War foretold the beginning of the end of nuclear weapons and heralded a call for their complete elimination. Their positions reflect a moral uneasiness about a U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons to deter aggression and a nagging fear that something could go terribly wrong. The reaction against nuclear deterrence argues either for radical disarmament or a technical fix to reduce nuclear danger or even a combination of the two.
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The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists summarized many of the arguments against nuclear weapons. In a recent Bulletin, Hugh Gusterson lambasted President Bush and alleged he prostituted the normal and routine nuclear discourse into a justification for BMD. In it, he says:
[Contrary] to the Clinton Administration…Bush... has attempted to use the debate about [BMD] to transform the official discourse on nuclear weapons and arms control. …What we see here -aided and abetted by a striking lack of skepticism in the media -is the creation of a new axiom … called the "second nuclear age." …Although Bush … speaks of missile defense as a purely defensive technology… I have it on good authority … from former Clinton sources … that … Pentagon planners are very interested … to neutralize the 20 single-warhead missiles in China… The new discourse … has been hijacked by today's superannuated Cold Warriors as a way of justifying the abrogation of old arms control treaties, the construction of new weapons, and the militarization of space.
[BMD] is the armed wing of globalization. It is a euphemism for plans to ensure U.S. military and economic domination of the planet.
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It is difficult to see how either side might ever reconcile the differences short of complete elimination of nuclear weapons -a position, that absent a threat, both sides would most likely agree with the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
EMERGING BUSH DOCTRINE -THE THIRD MILLENNIUM
As the "Global War on Terrorism" unfolded, the Bush Administration continued to develop Further, it stressed that capabilities-based planning would be required to mitigate risks associated with long-term challenges and to hedge against strategic surprise in near future.
The Administration recognized that capabilities-based planning was difficult in describing future threats with any precision and shifted instead to an approach that described the desirable capabilities. leaders a broader array of options for ensuring national security. It would require fewer warheads and would allow major cuts to the nuclear arsenal. 
ANALYSIS -THE FOUR "D's"
[D]eterrence alone won't suffice in this unpredictable, multi-polar world… How do you deter a non-state actor who has no return address? … How do you deter or dissuade someone whose reward is in the after-life. Admiral Richard Mies 
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Assessing the Bush Doctrine using this model will identify strengths and weaknesses of the course begun by the Administration and DoD. Deterrence is assessed using the prevailing concepts of mutual vulnerability and assured retaliation with some augmentation of conventional forces. Dissuasion refers to prevention of aggression through engagement. Defense illustrates that strategic defense is both appropriate and inevitable. Denial prevents aggression by offensive means using diplomatic, economic and military means and also includes the concept of preemption. As the analysis below will show, the "4-Ds" encompass the solution set for dealing with Third Millennium threats and can be used to grade the Bush Doctrine for meeting that threat.
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DETERRENCE
For the foreseeable future, deterrence will continue to require capabilities and forces that provide the President with the widest range of options to prevent aggression and to ensure that in the mind of a potential aggressor, the risks of aggression will far outweigh the potential gains.
In the future, both offensive and defensive deterrence will apply. Offensive deterrence consists of conventional and nuclear means. Both increase the potential risks to a potential aggressor by holding at risk what they value. Defensive deterrence forces will decrease potential gains by denying an aggressor's ability to hold the U.S. at risk. The combination of offense and defense capabilities makes an attack and coercion less likely. The crux of nuclear deterrence will remain a credible response that contains both the means and the will to use it. The key component of U.S. deterrence strategy against other nuclear powers will remain offensive nuclear weapons and the concepts of assured destruction and retaliation will remain the relevant concepts.
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Though conventional weapons have become much more lethal and accurate, nuclear weapons retain a significant psychological value and are the only current means of holding several classes of targets at risk -mobile, fixed hardened, and distributed targets. Hardened facilities are designed to withstand conventional and nuclear weapons effects. Hardened targets built underground or deeply buried facilities are the most difficult to destroy and influences the number and characteristics of nuclear weapons used. Examples include: missile silos, control centers, concrete shelters, deeply buried command posts and WMD production facilities. 44 Against non-nuclear threats, nuclear weapons lose credibility due to the question of will. It is reasonable to say the U.S. would not resort to using nuclear weapons in most nonnuclear circumstances unless under some dire circumstance --most likely those involving chemical and biological weapons.
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Deterrence requires accurate intelligence. It works if, and only if, the adversary or potential adversary wants to be deterred. Deterrence implies several things: knowing or anticipating and adversaries capabilities and intentions, identifying the adversary's center of gravity, determining how to hold him convincingly at risk, and having the capabilities and willingness to employ them to ensure compliance with U.S. strategic objectives. The immediate goals in this new post-Cold War arms control process would be: to promote mutual consultation and coordination, while providing each side with the prerogative to adapt its strategic force posture according to its respective requirements in a dynamic strategic environment; to reduce the prospect for misunderstanding and surprise; and to improve the basis for confidence and mutual trust and thus reduce the MAD-inspired level of mutual animosity and suspicion. The long term goal in reestablishing arms control along these lines would be to facilitate more amicable U.S.-Russian political relations, and thus greater security for each. … [A] new approach … without the Cold War anchor of a competitive and highly legalistic negotiating process keyed to MAD.
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This new approach to arms control is intended to help reorient U.S.-Russian relations away from the post-Cold War era. The old approach contributed to an adversarial relationship that was based on MAD and was counterproductive and dangerous. In the Administration's view, this new approach to U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions did not need to be linked to treaty mechanisms nor codified. Their underlying premise was the two largest nuclear powers did not need to be engaged in a nuclear competition. They contended that negotiations could focus on establishing "full disclosure" of each side's nuclear and missile defense programs; their intentions, goals and rationale; as well as strengthen the transparency and predictability in their respective programs. 
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A "good enough" BMD system provides the President with options other than nuclear retaliation to respond in times of extreme crisis. Existing nuclear and conventional offensive deterrence capabilities would complement a BMD capability. These overlapping deterrent capabilities provide a dilemma for the would-be aggressor and a reinforcing and complementary capability to the U.S. deterrence strategists 55 .
DENIAL
Denial requires convincing an opponent that he will not attain his goals on the battlefield.
Often, denial is achieved through preemption and preemptive strikes. Denial differs from deterrence in how it prevents aggression. The distinction is key because deterrence is often based on punishment that threatens to destroy an opponent's population and industry. Denial uses all the tools of national power -diplomatic, economic, informational and military. With the growing phenomenon of globalization and the increased sophistication of weapon systems, the concept of denial becomes very important.
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The most apparent military tool of denial is preemption and preemptive strikes.
Preemptive strikes attack known threat targets that are poised to strike and done so before an the adversary uses them to do harm. attacks -strategic ends achieved using conventional means. As they proposed, the strike forces would be composed of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. The conventional arm would be made possible with recent improvements in precision guidance, miniaturization and explosives that are capable of defeating hard and deeply buried targets.
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CONCLUSION
This review of U.S. deterrent strategy and theory points to the need for a more adaptable and flexible nuclear deterrent strategy -one that sheds the trappings of the Cold War and adjusts to the more complex and multi-polar world in this Third Millennium. It appears that traditional approach to strategic nuclear deterrence is incomplete in a changed world that is no longer dominated by a monolithic threat. With a changed threat comes a changed approach. In the Third Millennium, a deterrent policy based on nuclear retaliation of massive proportions is outmoded and most likely doomed to fail -with catastrophic consequences for the U.S.
This review of U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy explored the fundamentals of deterrent theory, the strategies used in the Cold War period, the strategy of Clinton in the post-Cold War, the emerging threats, the issues with Russia (the sole nuclear peer), the domestic counterperspective, and lastly the emerging doctrine of President Bush in the Third Millennium. The review showed a changed world and made the case of a compelling need for a more adaptable and flexible nuclear deterrent policy like the one proposed by the Bush Administration.
The review described the success of nuclear deterrence in the Cold War against a monolithic threat posed by Russia. It showed evidence, in this post-Cold War era, that the threat posed by non-state and rogue actors complicates the situation. It showed the propensity of rogue nations to acquire WMD and also the capability to deliver them in the not-too-distant future. The review showed that several states will be in a position to threaten the continental U.S. and U.S. interests abroad sooner rather than later. The review left the clear impression that developing strategies for deterring and/or eliminating these asymmetric threats will remain a significant challenge.
The review showed the new strategic relationship between the U.S. and Russia. It Using the strategy formulation model of ends, ways, and means used earlier for the Cold War and Clinton Era, 
